The Paradox Between Integration and Perceived Discrimination Among American Muslims

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Muslim Americans are increasingly integrated into American life, displaying high socioeconomic status, political participation, and adherence to American values. However, they are evaluated more negatively than many other racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and are frequent targets of discrimination. This article examines the mismatch between the integration of Muslims and their poor reception. Drawing on theories of cultural fluency and cognitive dissonance, we argue that cultural integration can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, perceived discrimination because integrated individuals are socialized to expect fair treatment and can recognize and decode even subtle forms of discrimination due to high levels of cultural and language fluency. Using three nationally representative surveys and an opt-in, online study of American Muslims between 2007 and 2017, we find that integrated Muslims are consistently more likely than their counterparts to report individual- and group-level societal and political discrimination. The paradox between adopting the host culture and feeling marginalized poses a challenge to the assumption that integration naturally leads to a sense of belonging among minorities, with important implications for liberal democracies.

KEY WORDS: discrimination, Muslim Americans, identity, integration, race and ethnic politics

Immigration has changed the face of the United States over the last half-century. The foreign-born population of 9.7 million in 1960 grew to 43.7 million by 2016. At the same time, the population diversified: While 84% of immigrants were from Europe and Canada in 1960, only 13% were by 2016. As the foreign-born population has grown and diversified, they have broken down social, cultural, and economic barriers to inclusion, building vibrant and successful communities (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Nonetheless, concerns over demographic shifts have triggered hostility towards migrants among majority-group citizens, with second- and third-generation
minorities continuing to face discrimination (Hopkins, 2010; Parker & Barreto, 2014). In this article, we seek to examine the link between cultural integration and perceptions of differential treatment. Specifically, we consider whether cultural integration mitigates perceived discrimination, as intuition might lead us to expect, or whether it exacerbates the recognition of differential treatment.²

Our study focuses on American Muslims, one of the most maligned populations in the United States (Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). We theorize that Muslims may be particularly likely to experience an integration-discrimination paradox where more culturally integrated individuals are more likely to report discrimination. Unlike ethnic minorities, Muslim minority status is based on religious identity with attendant beliefs that many Americans interpret as fundamentally antithetical to American values (Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2019). Across Western nations, Muslims are portrayed as living in “parallel societies,” existing in self-imposed exclusionary communities within a wider secular state (Dowling, 2010). Contrary to these depictions, Muslim Americans are considered highly integrated insofar as they ascribe to democratic values and civic norms (Dana, Barreto, & Oskooii, 2011; Dana, Wilcox-Archuleta, & Barreto, 2017; Ocampo, Dana, & Barreto, 2018; Sediqe, 2019). Yet, they also report perceiving discrimination at high rates, with almost three-quarters saying their group faces “a lot of discrimination” in America today (Pew, 2017). Though most American Muslims believe the post 9/11 atmosphere is charged with anti-Muslim sentiment, they do not all report perceiving discrimination at similar rates (Mogahed & Chouhoud, 2018). We therefore ask how cultural integration is linked to perceived discrimination among first-generation Muslim immigrants and their descendants.³

We hypothesize that for Muslims, cultural integration exacerbates, rather than mitigates, perceptions of discrimination. We leverage two nationally representative datasets collected in 2007 and 2011 to test our hypothesis, and two additional surveys fielded in 2017 to further assess the link between integration and discrimination in the contentious post-Trump era. Our analysis provides strong evidence supportive of the contention that integrated Muslims are more likely than their counterparts to perceive discrimination. This relationship emerges across two separate measures of cultural integration—nativity and English language proficiency—and multiple measures of discrimination. The consistency of our findings across four datasets spanning a decade shows that they are not an artifact of survey design or temporal context.

Our study makes three key contributions. First, while a large body of work investigates the impact of discrimination on psychological outcomes or political attitudes and behaviors, we focus on the antecedents of perceiving discrimination. Our findings linking cultural integration to perceived discrimination contribute to the developing literature on the conditions under which discrimination is reported. Second, we consider the effects of integration on multiple indicators of discrimination, examining differences between individual- and group-level discrimination and social and political discrimination. Finally, while scholars have investigated the relationship between integration and discrimination among Latino immigrants, our focus on American Muslims considers evidence from a new and understudied group, whose experiences are based on religious identity rather than (or in addition to) race, nationality, or ethnicity.

²Research identifies cultural integration as one means by which members of new immigrant groups incorporate into their host country (Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010). Integrated individuals retain aspects of their culture of origin, while also adopting aspects of the host culture (Schwartz et al., 2010). Cultural integration tends to characterize 1.5 and second-generation immigrants who grew up in homes that preserve one’s culture of origin, but who are socialized in American schools, are more fluent in English, and who internalize American norms. Cultural integration is similar to, but is distinct, from the concept of immigrant incorporation, which generally refers to a societal or state approach to minority populations that “rejects permanent exclusion but neither demands assimilation nor embraces formal multiculturalism” (Freeman, 2004, p. 945). Cultural integration is evaluated at the individual or group level.

³We use “cultural integration” and “integration” interchangeably throughout the article.
We begin by first describing the status of Muslims in America and the conditions under which immigrants may perceive discrimination. We then present our theory and hypotheses, describe our datasets and measures, and present a series of findings. We conclude by suggesting that the signs of an established link between cultural integration and perceived discrimination undermines general expectations that come with integration, and we recommend that host communities should recognize acculturation as an ongoing process and work to reinforce minority-group belonging across generations to ensure social and democratic inclusion.

Background

Discrimination is a common experience for many minority-group members in the United States, but over the last 20 years, Muslims have become one of the most aggressively targeted groups (Lajevardi, 2020). Anti-Muslim affect increased after September 11, 2001 (Morello, 2011), and negative perceptions of this group were aided by media portrayals and nativist rhetoric employed throughout Donald Trump’s presidential campaign (Lajevardi, 2016). In 2015, several states introduced laws designed to address the perceived “infiltration” of Islamic law in their institutions (CAIR, 2016). In the same year, hate crimes against Muslims increased by nearly 80% (Ocampo et al., 2018). Days after Trump’s election, the Southern Poverty Law Center documented over 1000 hate crimes against Muslims, with many of the perpetrators citing Trump as justification in some form.4

Much of this behavior is tied to old-fashioned racism, where one views Muslims as inherently inferior to one’s own group (Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). Perceptions of inferiority are strengthened by stereotypes depicting Islam as intolerant, misogynistic, and perpetually foreign (Selod, 2015; Sides & Gross, 2013). Muslim women who wear the hijab, for example, are viewed as victims of an oppressive culture (Haddad, 2007), while Muslim men are viewed as violent “radical outsiders” (Dana, Lajevardi, Oskooii, & Walker, 2019). Consequently, 75% of Muslim Americans surveyed by Pew think there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims in the United States (Pew, 2017). Yet, while discrimination is pervasive, Muslims do not perceive experiencing discrimination at equal rates. What accounts for intragroup heterogeneity in perceived discrimination among this group?

Perceived discrimination is the belief that one has been treated differently as a consequence of one’s identity. Contextual factors and repeated exposure to negative societal cues interact with other demographic features to increase the likelihood of interpreting various experiences as discriminatory (Santana, 2018). Research on the underlying factors that lead individuals to perceive discrimination is mixed (Santana, 2018). First-generation immigrants displaying minority-group attributes are regular targets of discrimination due to language, accent, and ethnicity that mark them as outsiders (Lavariega Monforti & Sanchez, 2010; Pedraza, 2014; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001). New immigrant groups may likewise be subject to discrimination from native-born members in their own community. For example, research finds that native-born Latinos are more likely to view immigrants as a burden on the country than are the foreign-born (Lavariega Monforti & Sanchez, 2010). Social distancing may also occur between foreign and native-born immigrants, as individuals strive to disassociate themselves with the negative stereotypes ascribed to the foreign-born (Bedolla, 2005).

Yet, even as first-generation immigrants face discrimination from both dominant group members and their native-born counterparts, later generations who are more culturally integrated may face ongoing discrimination from dominant group members as well, and in some instances, they may be more likely to perceive discrimination. For example, researchers observe divergent levels of trust in government among Latinos who are foreign-born and native-born, with first-generation immigrants more trusting than the second generation (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010). Trust in government is itself diminished by experiences with discrimination. Moreover, second-generation immigrants

differ from foreign-born immigrants in important ways. They are generally integrated into the host culture through socialization in schools, accent-free English, and high levels of social and economic attainment. For this group, ongoing experiences with discrimination from the dominant group is less likely to be about nativity or concerns over immigration, and more about overt racism or xenophobia.

Vilification from society on the basis of race or ethnicity indelibly shapes processes of integration that manifests among those removed from the immigrant experience (Garcia-Ríos, Pedraza, & Wilcox-Archuleta, 2019; Pérez, 2015). Classic theories of assimilation predict that new immigrants will grow to adopt the attitudes and behaviors of the dominant group as they are in the country longer (Portes, Parker, & Cobas, 1980; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Yet, the persistence of racial hierarchy in the United States interacts with the process of assimilation, leading subsequent generations who do not or cannot become fully one with native white Americans to downwardly assimilate, remaining apart from mainstream society and at times achieving less socioeconomic success than their predecessors (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Safi, 2009; Zhou, 1997).

Indeed, persistent experiences with discrimination among Latinos in the United States leads to “segmented assimilation,” whereas individuals begin to learn and adopt the country’s values, they become increasingly aware of their marginalized status (Portes et al., 1980). Rather than fully assimilating, individuals start to reject some aspects of the host culture and lean into their heritage culture, carving out a unique American identity rooted in Democratic values of equality and pluralism (Flores-González, 2017; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). About this strategy of selective assimilation, Portes and Zhou (1993) write, “remaining securely ensconced in their co-ethnic community, under these circumstances, may be not a symptom of escapism but the best strategy for capitalizing on otherwise unavailable material and moral resources” (p. 93).

Thus, there is a growing scholarly consensus that cultural integration is one key factor associated with heightened perceptions of discrimination for groups who bear observable markers of difference. Yet, nearly all of this research concerns immigrants from Latin America, and much less is known about Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans are marked for difference on the basis of religion, itself not always observable. This may set their experiences with discrimination apart from other immigrant groups. Like Latinos, observable factors like attending the mosque, wearing a hijab, or even a person’s name are associated with a greater likelihood of reporting discrimination, as is a strong racial identity (Dana et al., 2019; Welborne, Westfall, Russell, & Tobin, 2018). Moreover, as previously noted, Muslims are increasingly singled out as a threat to American values and traditions. Integration for this group may likewise be associated with increased perceived discrimination, as cumulative experience with U.S. culture primes them to expect differential treatment.

Integration and Perceived Discrimination

Cultural integration is one form of acculturation, which describes a range of possible outcomes that emerge as immigrants retain or reject their culture of origin and the host society (Branton, 2007; Schildkraut, 2010). Acculturation is a complex, long-term, and two-way “process of brokered exchanges” between the dominant group and new immigrant groups (Pedraza, 2014, p. 901). These brokered exchanges yield a number of potential outcomes, depending on the experiences of the immigrant and the receptiveness of the host society. Individuals who retain their culture of origin and reject the host culture are thought to have acculturated separately, while those who embrace the host culture and reject their culture of origin are thought to have assimilated (Schwartz et al., 2010). Those who retain aspects of their culture of origin while embracing the host society, particularly as it pertains to norms and language, have culturally integrated. We theorize that cultural integration facilitates decoding social mores and political norms, revealing even subtle forms of differential treatment. Two primary mechanisms link cultural integration among Muslims to heightened perceived discrimination.
The first mechanism relates to the way linguistic and communication elements of integration promote cultural fluency. In the United States, the ability to speak English well is critical for cultural fluency, as is a deep familiarity with social norms that might come with being born in the country. Cultural fluency is necessary for understanding idiom, historic, and even popular culture references and is linked to the ability to recognize microaggressive behaviors (Sue et al., 2007). The subtle nature of microaggressions makes them difficult to recognize, raising questions about accuracy in perceiving discrimination. Hence, in order to recognize microaggressions, one must be able to “see the unseen” (Becker & Swim, 2011, p. 227). Victims must “constantly question the intention and message of the perpetrators,” requiring substantial cultural fluency for appropriate interpretation (Sue et al., 2007, p. 271).

Focus group interviews with Muslim women in Chicago demonstrates the importance of this mechanism (Welborne et al., 2018). As a group of women were discussing reactions to wearing a hijab, one U.S.-born woman of South Asian descent was discussing how often she feels that she is perceived as foreign because of her headscarf and how experiences of subtle discrimination have become noticeable to her:

Now this is normal treatment. This has become normal for me. People not making eye contact with me. People not opening the door for me. These are things that I subtly begin to pick up on the more educated I become on those social norms. That’s a personal thing, little microaggressions. They are not too overt.

The second mechanism relies on the effects of cognitive dissonance, which is psychological discomfort caused by an inconsistency in thoughts and beliefs. Socialization through systems like public education can expose individuals to norms and expectations, and those most likely to have been socialized in this way are those born in the United States, or brought to the country at a very young age. In particular, a vision of American democracy, equality, and multiculturalism is advanced in U.S. public institutions. To someone born in the country, who is socialized to uphold these values and who believes themselves to be entitled to equal treatment, experiencing differential treatment will evoke cognitive dissonance. This dissonance could contribute to the development of a political consciousness reflecting the belief that one has been denied the right to equal treatment by their fellow citizens and by one’s country.

Research on Latino immigrants offers insights into the relationship between socialization, cognitive dissonance, and perceived discrimination. The children of undocumented immigrants who came of age in the United States, went to school, and attended college experience a level of integration not enjoyed by their parents (Abrego, 2011). Though they may also lack documentation, their relationship to society and to the law is fundamentally different. Whereas their parents’ relationship to the law is characterized by fear of being discovered and detained, the children of the undocumented experience the law through the lens of injustice (Abrego, 2011).

Similar tensions are at work in the Muslim community. As evidenced by the 2012 focus group interviews Welborne et al. (2018) conducted, Muslim women believe there is little difference between themselves and other Americans where it matters, which is in their appreciation of fundamental values, patriotism, and civic engagement. Nevertheless, all of these women described instances where they had to confront discrimination because of their faith, which resulted in personal turmoil and feelings of dissonance. A U.S.-born white woman from Chicago discussed her feelings of bitterness when non-Muslims asked ignorant questions about Islam and her practice of hijab:

What has gotten me more bitter lately is just sitting there asking the question of “Why is it my responsibility?” When I sit there and think about it, “How is it that this comes to me? Whatever the hell happened that makes it come to me, that puts me in this position, that has nothing to
do with me?” I think about how unfair that is. I’ve become more in tune to picking up on why people are approaching me. Are they approaching with hostility, just to tell me I’m going to go to hell, or because they are genuinely curious? A part of me is always on alert. I really shouldn’t have to do this. But I will.

This statement captures the cultural fluency required to determine intent, but a stronger sense of injustice over having to continually cope with discrimination.

These testimonies demonstrate that cultural fluency and cognitive dissonance are central to cultural integration. They allow Muslims to recognize differential treatment and to view it as an injustice. We therefore argue that cultural integration is an important fault line for Muslims, and one that has not been adequately recognized in the literature. We attempt to overcome this oversight by offering a number of testable hypotheses about how the relationship between integration and perceived discrimination works.

Hypotheses

We hypothesize that:

H1: Culturally integrated Muslims will report experiencing discrimination at higher rates than Muslims who are not culturally integrated.

Cultural fluency and cognitive dissonance work together to heighten the perception and understanding of discriminatory experiences. Because cultural fluency relates to familiarity with patterns of communication and the ability to recognize meaning, we expect that cultural fluency will make Muslims more likely to perceive discrimination. Two central markers of cultural fluency are (1) English language fluency, which aids in communication, and (2) being born and socialized in the United States, which attaches culturally sensitive meaning to actions. Both markers increase the likelihood of detecting discrimination. Meanwhile, cognitive dissonance, triggered by a violation of social norms among integrated individuals, lowers the threshold for reporting discrimination. Those born and socialized in the United States will be most likely to sense this dissonance and resent discriminatory treatment. Empirically, however, both mechanisms result in the same outcome of higher rates of reported discrimination among those who are culturally integrated.

We also offer two subhypotheses. The first relates to the difference between societal and political discrimination. Societal discrimination is differential treatment emanating from rank-and-file members of the society, while political discrimination emanates from the government (Oskooii, 2018). We anticipate that the related mechanisms of increased cultural fluency and cognitive dissonance around disparate treatment will yield heightened reports of societal discrimination. Political discrimination, which can include profiling in airports and stop-and-frisk policies, will be more explicit by its very nature because its execution requires communicating clear standards of differentiation to political actors. We anticipate that political discrimination is fairly obvious to individuals who experience it and that it requires little cultural fluency to detect. This leads to our first subhypothesis:

H1a: Cultural integration will be more strongly associated with the perception of societal discrimination compared to political discrimination.

Within the psychological literature there is an important discrepancy in whether an individual perceives more discrimination directed at their group compared to themselves (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). Most research finds that people are more likely to perceive discrimination against their group as opposed to being personally discriminated against (see Foster 2000 for
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a review of this literature). With respect to the impact of cultural fluency, we anticipate that cognitive dissonance should function in similar ways for perceptions of both group and individual discrimination, even as baseline perceptions of group discrimination are likely to be higher than those of individual discrimination. This leads to our final subhypothesis:

\[ H1b: \] Cultural integration will be positively associated with both the perception of group-level and individual-level discrimination.

Data and Measures

Our analytic approach examines the association between two key markers of integration and perceived discrimination. Accordingly, we first marshal two publicly available and nationally representative datasets of Muslim Americans: the 2007 and 2011 Pew Research Center surveys.\(^5\) Both surveys were administered with live callers in English, Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi and asked a variety of questions related to the sociopolitical and religious beliefs, practices, and experiences of U.S. Muslims. The sample and design of the surveys is ideal for our purposes because they each contain two common measures of cultural integration: nativity and language proficiency. Importantly, the surveys contain several measures of discrimination that are identical in question wording and response format. This enables us to replicate our analyses across two separate, cross-sectional datasets collected four years apart.

Our analysis contains five specific outcome measures to gauge perceptions of individual-level and group-level discrimination in different social and political domains. This approach is consistent with prior research, which considers discrimination as a multidimensional concept and recommends the adoption of context-specific measures over global discrimination scales that may mask important attitudinal and behavioral variations (Oskooii, 2016, 2018; Schildkraut, 2005). At the individual level, respondents were asked to report if they have personally encountered the following three situations in the past 12 months because of their Muslim identity: (1) Have people acted as if they are suspicious of you? (2) Have you been called offensive names? and (3) Have you been singled out by airport security?\(^6\) Whether one has been singled out by airport security serves as the key indicator of individual experiences with political discrimination, while suspicious looks and offensive names are used to indicate experiences with societal discrimination. The response categories for these measures are 0 = “no” and 1 = “yes.” Using original survey weights, suspicious looks is the most common type of discrimination reported (26% in 2007 and 28% in 2011) across both samples, followed by airport discrimination (18% and 21%), and offensive remarks (15% and 22%).

Perceived group-level political discrimination is operationalized with the following question: Do you think that the government’s antiterrorism policies single out Muslims in the United States for increased surveillance and monitoring, or don’t you think so? This variable is dichotomous, with 0 = “no” and 1 = “yes.” Excluding “refused” or “don’t know” response categories, 68% of 2007 and 59% of 2011 respondents believed that the U.S. government targets Muslim Americans. The difference in reported individual-level airport discrimination and perceptions of group-level government discrimination is consistent with the personal/group discrimination discrepancy, whereby individuals generally report higher rates of discrimination directed at their group, rather than themselves (Taylor et al., 1990). Due to this known discrepancy, we also consider group-level perceptions of societal discrimination with the following question available only in the 2011 dataset: “Are the American

\(^5\)See Appendix B in the online supporting information for more technical details about the surveys.

\(^6\)We excluded two other available questions from our analysis—physically threatened or attacked and whether respondents were singled out by other law enforcement officials—due to a very low number of participants who reported personally experiencing such encounters. For example, only 29 out of 1050 respondents in 2007 indicated that they have been physically threatened or attacked.
people generally friendly, neutral, or unfriendly toward Muslim Americans?” Overall, about half of the respondents indicated that Americans are generally friendly, while 32% took the neutral position, and 16% viewed fellow citizens as unfriendly. This variable is categorical, ranging from 1 to 3.

Our main explanatory construct consists of two separate and well-known proxies utilized by researchers focused on various aspects of acculturation outcomes (e.g., Branton, 2007; Cruz, Marshall, Bowling, & Villaveces, 2008; Lee, Nguyen, & Tsui, 2011). The first is nativity, which is operationalized by assigning foreign-born Muslims value 0 and U.S.-born Muslims value 1. The distribution of this indicator shows that foreign-born Muslims make up the majority of respondents, representing 73.4% and 71.5% of the 2007 and 2011 samples, respectively. The second indicator is English language fluency. Given that the Pew surveys do not specifically ask about languages spoken at home or self-reported proficiency levels with the English language, this indicator is constructed based on the chosen interview language. Lee, Nguyen, and Tsui (2011) find that interview language may serve as a better measure for acculturation among foreign-born populations with a high proportion of limited English proficiency. Individuals who opted to take the survey in English are assigned a value of 1 and those who took the survey in any other language are assigned a value of 0. Since only three non-English languages were available (Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu) across both surveys, this measure, while commonly used, may be somewhat noisy in that individuals who could not take the survey in their preferred language (e.g., Turkish) may have chosen to take it in English despite imperfect English language skills. While this is a potential limitation, it does not bias the results in favor of confirming our hypothesis. If anything, a statistically positive relationship between English language fluency and perceived discrimination might be harder to detect since our measure may include respondents who do not speak English very well.

Consistent with previous work, our analyses account for standard demographic controls and theoretically relevant covariates, which we describe in Appendix B in the online supporting information. Descriptive statistics for all of the 2007 and 2011 Pew measures are reported in Tables A11 and A12 in the online supporting information.

It may be the case that differential perceptions of discrimination by integration observed in the 2007 and 2011 datasets are diminished in the present context of heightened discrimination against Muslims. We therefore rely on two additional datasets fielded in 2017 to replicate our analyses in the contentious post-Trump United States. We first use a 2017 nationally representative sample of 1001 Muslim Americans administered by the Pew Research Center. At the individual level, this survey contains the same questions available in 2007 and 2011. At the group level, we use the same societal discrimination question that asks respondents whether American people are generally friendly, neutral, or unfriendly toward Muslim Americans. With respect to group-level political discrimination, the 2017 data does not include a question about the government’s security policy practices. In its place, there is a new question related to macrolevel perceptions of discrimination: In the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against Muslim Americans, or not? Overall, 77% of Muslims stated that there is a lot of discrimination against their group. While this question is fairly broad, we still include it in our analysis to provide an additional assessment of the relationship between integration and group-level discrimination.

The explanatory variables consist of the same nativity status and language proficiency questions as in the previous Pew surveys. We also account for the same aforementioned control variables with the caveat that the 2017 survey does not include measures of political interest, Muslim/American identity, region of residence, and mosque involvement outside of prayer services. Descriptive statistics for all of the 2017 Pew variables are reported in Table A13 in the online supporting information.

We also rely on a second dataset fielded between February and March 2017 by Survey Sampling International (SSI). This survey is an opt-in, online study that is not representative of the overall U.S. Muslim population and differs in several important ways from the Pew studies. First, the SSI sample
Integration and Perceived Discrimination consists of more native-born (70%) than foreign-born respondents (30%) and contains slightly more educated respondents than the Pew surveys. Second, the SSI questionnaire is somewhat limited. For example, the survey does not contain questions about political discrimination or any group-level perceptions of differential treatment. Third, the survey was only available in English, precluding non-English speakers from taking the survey. Therefore, we do not have an indicator of English language fluency. Finally, given known challenges of recruiting Muslim American participants (Hobbs & Lajevardi, 2019), the sample only contains 214 completed interviews. These limitations aside, the dataset still provides yet another opportunity to replicate some of the main findings with a different sample of Muslims in the months after the 2016 presidential election.

Our outcome measures consist of three precise questions about individual-level societal discrimination, two of which are similar to the Pew questions. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they have encountered the following because they are Muslim: (1) People act as if they are suspicious of you; (2) People called you offensive names or treated you with less respect; and (3) People act as if they are afraid of you. For each of these questions, we constructed a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 4, with the highest value indicating “very often” and the lowest value indicating “never.” Integration is operationalized by coding native-born respondents as 1 and foreign-born respondents
as 0. The data also contains standard demographic controls and the following covariates: political interest, hijab, mosque attendance, and strength of Muslim identity. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A14 in the online supporting information.

Analysis and Results

Pre-Trump Era Findings

To examine the relationship between integration and perceived individual- and group-level societal and political discrimination, we estimate three regression models per outcome variable and dataset. We estimate the models iteratively to first show the bivariate relationship between measures of integration and discrimination before adding standard demographic controls and the full suite of potential confounders.

We begin by assessing reports of suspicious looks. Logistic regression models 1 and 4 in Table A1 in the online supporting information demonstrate that both nativity and English fluency are positively associated ($p < .01$) with perceiving suspicious looks in 2007 and 2011. Additional models (2, 3, 5, and 6) show that this relationship is robust to alternative specifications. All else equal, native-born Muslims and those who speak English fluently are more likely than their counterparts to report that people have acted as if they are suspicious. To help visualize these relationships, we computed and plotted predicted probabilities of reporting individual-level discrimination by nativity and language fluency in Figure 1. As column 1, row 1 of the graphic illustrates, the predicted probability of reporting this form of discrimination among foreign-born respondents is close to 18%. This difference corresponds to an average marginal effect of 11 [3.2, 18.2] percentage points. In 2011, the effect sizes are nearly identical, with native-born Muslims being about 11.8 [5.0, 18.6] percentage points more likely than their foreign-born counterparts to perceive suspicious looks. The findings further demonstrate that language fluency is positively associated with reports of suspicious looks in both 2007 and 2011 (see column 2, row 1 of Figure 1). In 2007, the predicted probability of discrimination is 22.5% among those fluent in English and 9% among those not fluent—a marginal effect of 13.5 [6.2, 20.8] percentage points. In 2011, Muslims fluent in English were 18.8 [12.3, 25.2] percentage points more likely than their counterparts to report perceiving suspicious looks. These findings comport with our general hypothesis that cultural fluency is positively associated with heightened perceived discrimination.

Moving to the next individual-level societal discrimination measure, Table A2 in the online supporting information displays the link between integration and reports of offensive remarks/names. The findings again support the expectation that highly integrated respondents are more likely than their counterparts to perceive societal discrimination. Across the different models and datasets, indicators of integration are positively associated with reporting verbal abuse. Row 2 of Figure 1 visualizes the substantive significance of this relationship. In 2007, the predicted probability of being called offensive names is about 15% among U.S.-born Muslims. The corresponding predicted probability among foreign-born respondents is 10%. In 2001, we find a similar substantive difference by nativity. U.S.-born respondents are 8.4 [2.4, 14.3] percentage points more likely than their counterparts to report being called offensive names. All else equal, the results further illustrate that those who speak English fluently are more likely to report being subjected to such negative encounters in their day-to-day lives.

\(^7\)We also calculated average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals, which we report throughout the text.  
\(^8\)Table A9 in the online supporting information demonstrates that this relationship is robust to combining the societal discrimination measures into an additive scale.
Our general expectation is that cultural fluency will be associated with increased perceived discrimination, but in more specific terms, that it will be particularly important for societal, rather than, political discrimination. The primary indicator of individual-level political discrimination is the perception that one has been singled out by airport security. Table A3 in the online supporting information shows that English fluency is positively associated with airport discrimination (p < .05), but only at the bivariate level. Similarly, nativity is associated with being singled out by airport security, but the relationship is negative. That is, U.S.-born Muslims, possibly due to their citizenship status, may perceive better treatment than their foreign-born counterparts who may not hold a U.S. passport. We should note here that this negative relationship disappears altogether once we account for confounding variables (see models 2 and 3 in Table A3). Moreover, nativity is not associated with airport discrimination in any of the 2011 models. But, we do find a statistically significant positive relationship between language fluency and perceptions of airport discrimination. Row 3, column 2 of Figure 1 shows that only English fluency in the 2011 dataset is predictive of airport discrimination. More precisely, Muslims fluent in English are 9.7 [1.4, 18.0] percentage points more likely than their counterparts to report being singled out by airport security. This offers modest support for the hypothesis that cultural fluency is more important for perceptions of societal discrimination than it is for political discrimination.

The next set of results examines perceptions of group-level discrimination. We anticipate that cultural fluency will impact perceived group discrimination in ways that are similar to perceived individual-level discrimination. Beginning with political discrimination, Table A4 in the online supporting information shows a fairly robust relationship between integration and the perception that antiterrorism policies in the United States tend to single out Muslim Americans for increased surveillance. Across the board, nativity increases the likelihood of perceiving differential treatment. English fluency is positively linked to perceptions of policy discrimination in the 2011 models, but only in the bivariate 2007 model. Row 1 of Figure 2 visualizes the findings. In 2007, the predicted probability of perceiving political discrimination among native-born Muslims is 82.1%, but 64.3% among foreign-born individuals. This difference corresponds to an average marginal effect of 17.2 [9.6, 24.8] percentage points. In 2011, U.S.-born Muslims are 20.4 [13.1, 27.8] percentage points more likely than their counterparts to perceive group-level political discrimination. As previously noted, English fluency is not statistically significant in 2007, but the effect size is large and significant in 2011 (p < .01)—a marginal effect of 24.2 [11.3, 37.1] percentage points.

Our final set of pre-Trump era results examine perceptions of group-level societal discrimination. Once again, the evidence shows that integration is an important explanatory variable in understanding perceptions of differential treatment. Both proxies of integration across all the three ordered-logistic regression models in Table A5 in the online supporting information are positively associated (p < .05) with believing that American people are generally (un)friendly toward Muslim Americans. Row 2 in Figure 2 displays simulated probabilities of the “friendly” response category of this variable. As illustrated, there is a sizable gap of about 20 percentage points between U.S.-born and foreign-born respondents, and 15 percentage points between fluent and nonfluent English speakers. Thus, while we have fewer variables across the two datasets with which to measure group-level discrimination and the findings are slightly more mixed, the general trend is in keeping with those observed with respect to individual-level discrimination. This offers fairly strong support for our final hypothesis, which contends that cultural fluency will similarly impact individual- and group-level discrimination.

**Post-Trump Era Findings**

Findings from the 2007 and 2011 datasets suggest that cultural integration is linked to heightened perceptions of discrimination among Muslim Americans, particularly when it comes to individual-level societal discrimination. One critique of the preceding analysis is that the datasets predate
the contentious Trump era, and it could be that in a moment of heightened marginalization of this population there would be no differences by levels of integration. To evaluate this possibility, we turn to the 2017 Pew and SSI surveys. Table A6 in the online supporting information reports the results of Pew models where we regress each individual-level discrimination measure on the indicators of integration. For ease of interpretation, Figure 3 provides a summary of the main results with predicted probabilities and 90% confidence bands. Beginning with suspicious looks, we find that nativity and language fluency are both positively associated with discrimination. The predicted probability of reporting this type of discrimination is 36.1% for native-born Muslims and only 21.5% for foreign-born Muslims. A similar gap exists by language fluency. Respondents who took the survey in English are 16.9 [4.6, 29.2] percentage points more likely than those who took the survey in Farsi, Urdu, or Arabic to state that people have acted as if they are suspicious of them.

Row 2 of Figure 3 shows a similar relationship with respect to nativity and offensive remarks. However, despite a modest gap in reported discrimination by language fluency, the difference between fluent and not fluent speakers does not reach traditional bounds of statistical significance. We note, however, that both nativity and language fluency are positively associated with the societal discrimination scale (see Models 5 and 6 in Table A6 in the online supporting information where we combine responses to suspicious looks, offensive remarks, and physical threat). Consistent with the 2007 and 2011 results, we also do not find that native-born Muslims are more likely than their counterparts to report having been singled out by airport security. There is some suggestive evidence that
individuals fluent in English are more likely to report airport discrimination than those not fluent, but the difference is not statistically significant at $p < .1$.

We now turn to the Pew group-level discrimination findings reported in Table A7 in the online supporting information. Row 1 of Figure 4 shows that both nativity and language fluency are positively associated with the perception that there is “a lot of discrimination” against Muslim Americans. Among native-born Muslims, the predicted probability of perceiving this type of group discrimination is 88.2%. For their foreign-born counterparts, the predicted probability is 76%. This gap corresponds to an average marginal effect of 12.2 [6.6, 17.7] percentage points. The difference by language fluency is even larger: a marginal effect of 28.2 [12.5, 43.9] percentage points. These findings extend to the second group-level measure. Row 2 in Figure 4 shows that both native-born and English fluent respondents are less likely than their respective counterparts to state that Americans are generally friendly.

Turning to the SSI data, Table A8 in the online supporting information reports the results of three ordered logistic regression models for each of the individual-level societal discrimination measures. Models 1, 4, and 7 present the bivariate relationships between U.S.-born status and each outcome measure. Across the board, we find positive and statistically significant (at $p < .05$) associations between nativity and perceived societal discrimination. Models 2, 5, and 8 introduce demographic controls, and the remaining models account for political interest, hijab or religious garb, mosque attendance, and the extent to which respondents identify as Muslim rather than American or by their

Figure 3. Integration and perceptions of individual-level discrimination (2017 Pew). Predicted probabilities with 90% confidence bands were calculated by keeping all of the fully specified model covariates in Table A6 in the online supporting information at their respective means.
national origin. In all of the models, native-born status is positively associated with societal discrimination (at \( p < .05 \)). In Figure 5, we display the predicted probability of reporting each type of discrimination for the “very often” and “none” response-category options. As illustrated, foreign-born respondents have a higher probability of reporting no discrimination compared to their native-born counterparts. Conversely, the predicted probability of perceiving discrimination very often is higher among U.S.-born Muslims. Overall, the SSI results provide additional evidence that integrated Muslims are more likely to perceive societal discrimination even in the contentious post-Trump era.

**Time of Arrival Analysis and Findings**

Given that foreign-born Muslims make up the majority of respondents, we are unable to fully capture variations in reported discrimination within this subset of the population with just language fluency. One way to overcome this shortcoming is to utilize another possible proxy of integration that applies to foreign-born respondents: length of time since arrival to the United States. Certainly, it can be argued that compared to immigrants who have lived in the United States for a long time, recent arrivals may not be as familiar with various norms, and their expectations of equal treatment are relatively lower due to their limited exposure to the American culture and legal system. This
Integration and Perceived Discrimination

unfamiliarity can particularly hamper their ability to fully decode subtler forms of differential treatment, resulting in fewer reports of discrimination.

To examine this, we draw on the 2017 Pew dataset, which asks foreign-born respondents when they arrived in the United States. Using this question, we created a categorical measure of time since arrival that groups respondents into five decades of arrival: prior to 1981 (14%), between 1981 to <1991 (18%), 1991 to <2001 (28%), 2001 to <2011 (21%), and 2011 to <2018 (19%). This variable ranges from 0 to 4 (μ = 1.86, SD = 1.30), with the highest value corresponding to respondents who arrived prior to 1981. We then replicated all of the 2017 Pew models, this time using time of arrival as our key proxy of integration.

Table A10 in the online supporting information reports the relationship between time of arrival and each of the five outcome variables. For ease of interpretation, we also report average marginal

Figure 5. Integration and perceptions of individual-level societal discrimination (2017 SSI). Predicted probabilities with 90% confidence bands were calculated by keeping all of the fully specified model covariates in Table A8 in the online supporting information at their respective means.
effects. Starting with suspicious looks, we find that those who have lived longer in the United States are more likely to report discrimination (at \( p < .05 \)). Substantively, those who arrived in the United States prior to 1981 are 18.9 [5.9, 32.0] percentage points more likely than those who arrived after 2011 to report suspicious looks. We also find that time of arrival is associated with reports of offensive remarks, although at \( p < .1 \) and with a substantively smaller effect size of 10 percentage points. Moving to airport discrimination, and consistent with all of the previous findings, there is no clear indication that more integrated Muslims report more discrimination at airports. However, we find statistically significant effects (\( p < .05 \)) in both group-level models of discrimination. With respect to general discrimination, newcomers are 30.1 [18.2, 43.8] percentage points less likely than their counterparts to perceive “a lot of discrimination” against Muslim Americans. Recent arrivals are also 7 [0.1, 14.4] percentage points less likely than those who have lived in the United States for over four decades to report that Americans are generally unfriendly toward Muslims. Overall, the time of arrival analyses show variations in reported discrimination among foreign-born Muslims, which provide additional evidence that integration may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, perceptions of discrimination.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

Our research was motivated by the observation that Muslim Americans are at once both integrated and increasingly vilified. We sought to examine the relationship between integration and discrimination in a variety of settings, hypothesizing that higher degrees of integration will increase perceptions of discrimination due to greater fluency with social cues and cognitive dissonance that results from a sense of entitlement to fair treatment.

Drawing on two nationally representative surveys, we found strong support for our hypotheses. Native-born Muslims (second generation and beyond) and those proficient in English are more likely to report perceiving discrimination across several distinct measures. Evidence from two additional surveys conducted in 2017 corroborate these findings and demonstrate that even in an era of heightened animosity towards Muslims, integration persists as an important determinant of perceiving discrimination. Nevertheless, the role of integration in this process is rarely discussed in studies of Muslim Americans. This is an oversight in the literature, given that perceived discrimination is linked to a host of important outcomes, from political attitudes and behaviors to mental health. For example, research demonstrates that vilification fosters the growth of a group-based identity even among those removed from the immigrant experience (Garcia-Rios et al., 2019; Pérez, 2015). Theories of downward assimilation stress that the reinforcement of social inferiority among minority groups persists and may even strengthen with second-generation immigrant groups (Safi, 2009), with feelings of marginalization severely impacting mental well-being (Paradies, 2006).

Moreover, the link between integration and discrimination yields serious political consequences that may pose a challenge to liberal democracies. Comparative research in Europe finds that second-generation immigrants are less likely than their first-generation counterparts to trust the government (Maxwell, 2010a, 2010b). Maxwell (2009) further finds that high expectations of discrimination among Caribbeans in Britain—who tend to be more economically, culturally, and socially incorporated than South Asians—degrades positive attachment to British identity. In the United States, research suggests that experiences with discrimination can be alienating (Mitts, 2019) and may reduce the likelihood of political engagement (Oskooii, 2016). About the link between integration and trust among Latinos, Abrajano and Alvarez (2010) write: “For immigrants who are considered to be a racialized group in the U.S., their experience with discrimination serves to re-emphasize the distinctive nature of the ethnic group…thus, despite advancements at the socioeconomic level, discrimination may cause immigrants to feel less politically empowered and efficacious” (p. 117). This suggests that full incorporation into American society is stymied by the racialization of
one’s community as foreign, even as subsequent generations are native born, boast English as a first language, and achieve higher socioeconomic status than their predecessors.

As similar trends of exclusion continue to persist toward Muslim Americans, our study suggest that integration may not lead to a two-way acculturation. The process of two-way acculturation requires that minorities be embraced by the host community. The vilification of Muslims disrupts the process of acculturation, ensuring their ongoing marginalization. If acculturation is a desired outcome for liberal democracies, efforts need to be made to help host communities understand their role as participants in the acculturation process. Corrections at the community level should include increased attention to developing a sense of community cohesion and belonging for 1.5, second-, and third-generation immigrants, who by virtue of their cultural competence and legal and social entitlement to American rights and norms are the most likely to understand and resent differential treatment.

Our findings are not without caveats. Data limitations did not permit us to test the specific mechanisms linking integration to perceived discrimination. We were also limited to only two proxies of cultural integration. Given the heterogeneity of the Muslim community, we hope that future data-collection efforts consist of survey questions related to integration and acculturation that goes beyond nativity and language fluency. This would enable social scientists to further examine the dynamics of integration and perceived discrimination among different subgroups of the population, as advocated by Chouhoud, Dana, and Barreto (2019). Additional proxies of integration would also facilitate a deeper examination of the link between integration and discrimination among foreign-born Muslims. This is particularly important given that the Muslim population boasts the greatest proportion of foreign-born constituents relative to other faith groups (Mogahed & Chouhoud, 2017).

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REFERENCES


Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web site:

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Table S2. Integration and Offensive Remarks
Table S3. Integration and Airport Discrimination
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Table S5. Perception of (Un)Friendliness Toward Muslim Americans
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Appendix S2
Additional Data and Variable Description Details